Posted: Tue Feb 08, 2005 2:33 pm
As soon as the DRL circuit runs into its 40 uA current limit, the power supply to all active electrodes is shut down. This prevents excessive current flow in case of multiple active electrode defects. In other words: the DRL current limit prevents too large currents between a defect active electrode and the DRL lead (Single Fault Condition), while the extra power supply shutdown prevents currents between different defect active electrodes (multiple faults at the same time).
The response time of the power shutdown circuit is in the order of milliseconds. Please note that this response time is only relevant in the unlikely case that two active electrodes break down at exactly the same moment, with the extra condition that one active electrode chip shorts its input to the positive power supply, and the other one shorts its input to the output. The more realistic scenario is as follows:
active electrode breakdown ----> DRL circuit limits current and shuts down the power supply to all active electrodes ---> further defects to other active electrodes cannot influence the safety situation anymore.
The DRL circuit can of course not "know" the origin of excessive currents. So, the safety circuit may indeed also be triggered by currents caused by RFI, ESD etc. This is exactly what we want the circuit to do: every current larger than 40 uA is considered unsafe, and should trigger the current limiter and active electrode power supply shutdown. Subject safety is the primary objective, even if the biopotential measurement is (momentarily) interrupted. However, thanks to the optimal isolation of the ActiveTwo front-end (battery power supply and fiber optic data transfer), leakage currents due to (HF) interference and ESD are typically much smaller than the 40 uA limit, and "false" triggering of the safety circuits is not a problem in practice.
Best regards, Coen (BioSemi)
The response time of the power shutdown circuit is in the order of milliseconds. Please note that this response time is only relevant in the unlikely case that two active electrodes break down at exactly the same moment, with the extra condition that one active electrode chip shorts its input to the positive power supply, and the other one shorts its input to the output. The more realistic scenario is as follows:
active electrode breakdown ----> DRL circuit limits current and shuts down the power supply to all active electrodes ---> further defects to other active electrodes cannot influence the safety situation anymore.
The DRL circuit can of course not "know" the origin of excessive currents. So, the safety circuit may indeed also be triggered by currents caused by RFI, ESD etc. This is exactly what we want the circuit to do: every current larger than 40 uA is considered unsafe, and should trigger the current limiter and active electrode power supply shutdown. Subject safety is the primary objective, even if the biopotential measurement is (momentarily) interrupted. However, thanks to the optimal isolation of the ActiveTwo front-end (battery power supply and fiber optic data transfer), leakage currents due to (HF) interference and ESD are typically much smaller than the 40 uA limit, and "false" triggering of the safety circuits is not a problem in practice.
Best regards, Coen (BioSemi)